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THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTROVERSY
WILLIAM 0. HOCHKIAMMER, JR.
The death penalty has been the subject of heated
debate in the United States for over 150 years.
During this period, both retentionists2 and abo-
litionists' have developed ritualistic arguments
on the key issues of the controversy. Even though
most arguments are based on opinion unsup-
ported by facts, both groups have used statistical
data and studies to prove the correctness of their
respective positions. Confusion has resulted because
the line between unsubstantiated opinion and fact
has not been clear. This comment will consider some
of the major areas of disagreement between re-
tentionists and abolitionists and assess the use of
the factual proof presented.
THE DETER-RENCE ISSUE
A major element of the controversy is whether
capital punishment, as claimed by retentionists,
is a unique deterrent to crime.4 Their argument is
that most people will not commit a crime if they
know they may be executed as a result; this is an
outgrowth of man's instinct for self-preservation.'
' For a discussion of the historical background of the
controversy see BEDAU, DEATH PENALTY IN AmERICA
7-13 (1st ed. 1964).
2This term is used to designate those who favor the
use of the death penalty.
'This term is used to designate those opposed to the
use of the death penalty. Of course many individuals
involved in this controversy do not fit neatly into
either the abolitionist or retentionist classification.
4 See, e.g., Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 FED. PROB.
3 (Sept. 1961).
5 See Gerstein, A Prosecutor Looks at Capital Punish-
ment, 51 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 252 (1960).
Retentionists attempt to emphasize the logic of
this argument by observing that people, when
they are absolutely determined to get results,
frequently resort to the threat of death. 6 Abo-
litionists note that some people commit crimes
for which they may be executed because of a con-
scious or subconscious desire to commit suicide, a
motivation that offsets any deterrent effect the
death penalty might have.7 The retentionists re-
ply that few criminals, especially hardened crimi-
nals, want to and expect to be punished for their
crimes. 8
Some abolitionists believe that the death penalty
increases the level of serious crime because those
who have already committed a capital crime will
not hesitate to commit others since they feel they
have nothing to lose.9 Retentionists counter that
if a life sentence is substituted for the death pen-
alty, a man who has committed a crime for which
he may be sentenced to life imprisonment would be
just as likely to commit other serious crimes
because he would also know he was already sub-
ject to the maximum penalty.'0 Neither position
is persuasive.
To the extent it is true that a criminal does not
6 Id. at 254.
7 See Comment, In Defense of Capital Punishment,
54 Ky. L.J. 743 (1966).
8 See Schmidelberg, The Offender's Attitude Toward
Punishment, 51 J. Cu R. L.C. & P.S. 328,332-33 (1960).
9 See, e.g., BEDAU, supra note 1, at 273.
10 See Comment, In Defense of Capital Punishment,
supra note 7, at 744.
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expect to be caught" or, if caught, to be convicted
or, if convicted, to be the recipient of the maxi-
mum sentence, it is also true that the criminal
will not be deterred by the most severe sentence
the law may impose on him.
The few attempts which have been made to
validate these arguments have failed to establish
conclusively the existence of a deterrent effect.
Consequently abolitionists have concluded either
that such an effect does not exist or, if it does,
that it is negligible." Retentionists have, however,
,disputed the validity of these studies8 by noting
that most were conducted by the opponents of
capital punishment (apparently making them
immediately suspect) and that these studies do
not take into account the number of crimes which
were actually deterred. 4 The fact that two states,
one with capital punishment and the other with-
out, have similar rates of crime does not prove
that there is no deterrent effect. It may be that the
factors contributing to a high crime rate are so
much stronger in the capital punishment state
that they are not offset by the death penalty
deterrent effect.
Since these studies contain potentially serious
defects, they should be accepted only with reser-
vations. They are suspect to the extent they are
based on assumptions which, unfortunately, can-
not satisfactorily be tested. For example, most
studies assume that the rate of capital murder
varies proportionally to the fluctuations in the
homicide rate. The statistics are based on data for
total homicides, rather than for capital murder
rates, which are generally unavailable.' 5 Thus,
when a study indicates that the homicide rate
did not increase after the abolition of the death
penalty, this does not eliminate the possibility
of an increase in the rate of capital murders. An
increase in the capital murder rate might simply
have been offset by a decrease in the rate of non-
negligent homicides.
1 See Schmidelberg, supra note 8, at 332-33, and
text accompanying note 8.
2See Sellin, supra note 4.
'aSee Reichert, Capital Punishment Reconsidered,
47 Ky. L.J. 397 (1958).
14 Gerstein, supra note 5 at 252-53. See also, Van
Den Haag, for comment On Deterrence and the Death
Penalty, 60 J. Cm. L. C. & P. S. 141 (1969), a recent
article, in which the author argues for the retention of
the death penalty. The author notes that the actual
number of persons deterred by the penalty is still un-
known.
15 Most available statistics On cause of death include
the category of homicide, but do not break this into
sub-categories. See BEDAU, supra note 1, at 277.
Recent studies with improved methodology
have to some extent quelled this uncertainty. For
example, it may now be possible to ascertain
more accurately the effect of capital punishment
in a comparison of state crime rates. Abolitionists
have, in the past, relied on unrefined statistics to
show that the homicide rates in states without the
death penalty do not differ substantially from
rates in death penalty states i Retentionists have
countered that factors other than the deterrent
effect of the death penalty-race, heredity, re-
gional lines, and standards of housing and educa-
tion-have an effect on crime rates." Grouping
the states according to similarities in the charac-
ter of the population, urban and industrial devel-
opment, and geographical proximity, a comparison
was made between states in the group which have
and those which do not have capital punishment.
This study supported the conclusion that those
states which fell into each group have similar homi-
cide rates, whether or not they have the death
penalty." Nevertheless, this study is inconclusive
since it does not consider crimes actually deterred
and it assumes there is a relationship between
capital murder and homicide rates.
The information presently available does not
provide an adequate basis for deciding whether
there is a deterrent effect. When the inconclusive
surveys are discounted, all that remains are state-
ments of opinion which must be treated with
scepticism.
THE DIscIMINATioN IssuE
Some aspects of the controversy are susceptible
to valid statistical analysis. An example is the
abolitionist criticism that the death penalty has
been discriminatorily applied since it is imposed
more frequently on the poor, the ignorant, and
minority group members than on other convicted
criminals wiho do not fit into these categories.19
If capital'punishment is not uniformly applied,
some say, it should be abolished.
Studies indicate that such discrimination
exists. For example, even though women commit
about one of every seven murders,20 of the 3,298
people executed for murder from 1930 through
1962, only 30 were women." There are also clear
" Id. at 264.
17 See Gerstein, supra note 5, at 252.
Is Sellin, supra note 4, at 6.
" See, e.g., Comment, Capital Punishmen, 29 TENN.
L. REv. 534, 542-45 (1962).
20 Id. at 542.
21 BEDAU, supra note 1, table 6 at 116-117.
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indications of discrimination on the basis of race.
From 1932 through 1957, twice as many Negroes
as whites were executed in the South.22 While
crime rates for different races are not equal, the
difference in the numbers of executions cannot
be explained on this basis." The factor of dis-
crimination becomes especially clear when the
numbers of whites and nonwhites who are exe-
cuted for rape are compared. From 1930 through
1962, 446 people were executed under civil au-
thority in the United States for rape. Of these, 45
were white, 399 Negro, and 2 American Indian.
436 of these executions were in the South-42
white, 392 Negro, and 2 American Indian.2
This discrimination also appears in a comparison
of the success with which Negroes and whites are
able to obtain commutations. Between 1914 and
1958 in Pennsylvania, whites received commuta-
tions three times as often as Negroes.2
5
Yet, even if the existence of discrimination can
satisfactorily be proven, it would be a mistake to
argue that capital punishment should be rejected
because some discrimination exists. The proper
approach is to remedy the defect, not abolish the
system. Emphasis should be on insuring uniform
application in the future.2 1 If there is any justifi-
cation at all for the death penalty it may well
overcome the objection of unequal application
which can be remedied by more conscientious
administration.
PROTECTION OF SOCIETY ISSUE
Retentionists argue that only the death penalty
can adequately protect society; the life sentence
alternative does not provide adequate protection
because criminals who are given a life sentence
are often paroled and thus able to commit other
22 Data indicating racial discrimination in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty is presented in Comment,
supra note 19.
23 See BEDAU, supra note 1, at 74-90 for an analysis
of criminal homicide by Marvin E. Wolfgang. On the
basis of all criminal homicides recorded by the Phila-
delphia Homicide Squad between January 1, 1948 and
December 31, 1952, the rate per 100,000 by race and
sex of offenders was: Negro males (41.7), Negro females
(9.3), white males (3.4), and white females (.4). BEDAu,
supra note 1, at 78.
24 Id. at 116-117.
25 Comment, supra note 19, at 543.
26 Some steps which result in greater uniformity of
application have already been taken. The indigent are
appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). They are also notified of their right of
counsel and having this counsel available before trial.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
crimes." Abolitionists counter that there is no
indication that people who have committed capital
crimes are more likely to commit other crimes than
those who are guilty of lesser crimes.2 Further-
more, many who commit repeated capital crimes
are adjudged legally insane and are not executed,
even in a capital punishment jurisdiction. 9 Be-
sides this, parole boards do not release criminals
unless they consider them unlikely to commit
additional crimes."°
To counter this, the retentionists claim that
prison personnel and inmates are put in a position
of danger when the life sentence is substituted for
capital punishment. Criminals under a life sentence
(especially those for whom the possibility of parole
is remote) are likely to kill in an attempt to escape
since they know their sentences cannot be in-
creased if the attempt fails. Even though this has a
surface plausibility, retentionists have been un-
able to offer proof in support of it. Some people
experienced in the handling of prisoners have
concluded that murderers, for example, are among
the best behaved prisoners." In addition, this
argument fails to recognize that nearly all pris-
oners, including those given a life sentence, will at
some time be eligible for parole. It is likely that
the loss of the possibility of parole would also be a
deterrent against killing to escape from prison.
Statistical information available is limited to
that concerning the dangers of paroling life pris-
oners. Most prisoners sentenced to life imprison-
ment will at some time be eligible for parole,82
and statistics show that most such prisoners
become successful parolees. Of 36 prisoners under
life sentence who were paroled between 1943 and
1958 in New York, only two were returned to
prison-one for a technical offense and the other
for burglary. Most of these prisoners would have
been executed if their sentences had not been
commuted.n Some retentionists emphasize that a
"See Gerstein, supra note 5 at 255.
" See Comment, supra note 19 at 550.
2" See In Defense of Capital Punishment, supra note 7,
at 246-47.
30 Whether or not parole boards can make accurate
decisions in this regard is open to question.
"See Comment, supra note 19, at 548; and Sellin,
supra note 4 at 6-7.
"See Comment, supra note 19 at 549.
3Id. at 550. Paine also reports other examples of
success in paroling convicted murderers. For example,
in Ohio 94.1% of such paroles were successful as com-
pared with a 74% success level for other paroles in that
state. Of the 164 first-degree murderers paroled in
Michigan between 1938 and 1961, only four were re-
[Vol. 60
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parole board may make a mistake--it may release
a person who is in fact very likely to commit other
crimes. While this possibility cannot be denied, it
does not provide a convincing reason for continued
use of the death penalty. One would hardly argue
that the right to a jury trial should be suspended
in serious cases because the jury might make a
mistake and allow a guilty person to go free.
OXIER ISSUES
One of the oldest and most popular arguments
for abolition is that innocent people are convicted
and may possibly be executed. Retentionists
respond that mistakes are unlikely; the presence
of the judge at trial and the impartial review upon
appeal provide adequate protection.
36 Further-
more, abolitionists have been unable to show many
instances in which it has been established that an
innocent person actually was executed, although
they have pointed to numerous cases in which
persons sentenced to prison were later to be found
innocent. 6 Perhaps the reason executions of
innocent persons seldom come to light is because
there is little impetus for a continued investigation
once a person has been executed for a crime.
Also, where the innocence of an executed person
is later established, the police are understandingly
hesitant to publicize the fact. But since the death
penalty is in fact imposed for only those capital
crimes which shock the public and where guilt is
dear,n and in light of the existing safeguards of
appellate review and the possibility of commuta-
tion, execution of the innocent is unlikely.
Another argument is that continued use of the
death penalty has resulted in the execution of the
mentally disturbed." Retentionists agree that the
execution of such persons is undesirable, but argue
that the mentally disturbed are adequately pro-
tected by the existing tests of legal insanity,
9 or
turned; just one of these four was returned for a new
felony. See also Sellin, supra note 4 at 6-8.
3 See In Defense of Capital Punishment, supra note 7
at 745.
35 d
36 See BEDAu, supra note 1, at 434-52.
a7 See In Defense of Capital Punishment, supra note
7 at 745.
's See, e.g., Gaetz, Should Ohio Abolish Capital Pun-
ishment?, 10 CiavE.-MAt. L. R1v. 365, 371-72 (1961).
89 Most jurisdictions use either the M'Naughten or
Durham rule to determine legal insanity. The
M'Naughten rule provides that if the defendant did
not know the nature of his act or that it was wrong, he
will be declared insane. The Durham rule provides
that one accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or
defect.
alternatively, that if these tests are inadequate,
the appropriate solution is to devise better tests,
not to abolish the death penalty.
"Pragmatic" arguments also enter the capital
punishment controversy. Retentionists claim that
it is less expensive to execute a criminal than to
confine him for a long period. The abolitionists
answer that if there is no possibility of a death
sentence, more convictions with fewer delays wil
result; thus less money and effort will be expended
on appeals designed only to delay and hinder.
4
Further, as an incidental effect, fewer guilty people
will be freed because juries will no longer have the
reluctance to bring in guilty verdicts when there
is no possibility of execution. Thus each group
claims the least expensive solution, but neither can
produce factual support.
These arguments must be carried on at the level
of opinion rather than fact, since proof is almost
impossible to obtain. The adequacy of existing
tests of insanity cannot be proven except by
reference to some standard which is in essence
nothing more than an opinion which is widely
accepted.4' It might be possible to compare the
costs of keeping a criminal in prison with the costs
of bringing one to execution, but it would be
difficult to test the accuracy of such a comparison.
There are difficulties in comparing criminals in
different states and in comparing those in the same
state at different times. The cost of executing a
criminal is increased by delays. The extent of such
40 See McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a
Correctional Administrator, 28 FED. PROB. 11, 13 (June
1964). Some writers have suggested that effective use
of prison labor power could be made and the cost to the
public of imprisonment thus reduced. See, e.g., Sellin,
supra note 4 at 3.
41 Both theM'Naughtenand Durham rules have come
under frequent criticism. The objection has often been
made that many dangerous offenders are medically
insane but do not qualify as legally insane under these
tests. For example, in Frigillana v. United States, 307
F. 2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1962) the court noted:
"We submit that under a standard or test based
upon the basic concepts of criminal responsibility
-that is cognition and volition or capacity to
control behavior-there might be some meaningful
medical testimony....
"As we see it the difficulty of the experts in this
case arose in large part because they did not under-
stand what 'product' means as stated in our rule,
for the term 'product' has no special generally ac-
cepted meaning in medicine. And of course it has
no special meaning in law."
For a discussion of the problems these rules present
for the psychiatrist "expert witness" called on to testify
as to insanity, see Halleck, The Psychiatrist and the
Legal Process, PSYcHOLOGy ToDAY, Vol. 2, No. 9 at 24
(Feb. 1969).
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delays depends upon the skill of attorneys and at
times the sympathy of public officials. Because of
differences in the importance of these factors in
individual cases, cost comparisons are nearly im-
possible. Such areas of the controversy are likely
to remain at the level of conflicting opinions for
lack of a factual basis on which they can be re-
solved.
PUBLIC OPINION
The death penalty has been abolished or severely
restricted in only thirteen states.4 But the aboli-
tionist movement has had an effect in those states
which have retained it since, in spite of increases
in population and. crime rates, the number of
annual executions has decreased. 0 From 1930
through 1964 there were 3,848 executions in the
United States. A comparison of the average annual
executions in selected five year periods shows con-
siderable decrease. There was an average of ap-
proximately 110 executions each year during the
period. But in the years 1930 through 1934, the
average was 155.2; from 1940 through 1944, an
average of 129; from 1950 through 1954, an average
of 82.6; from 1960 through 1964, an average of
36.2." Since 1964 the level of executions has
decreased further.
4
It is upon state legislatures that primary re-
sponsibility for the decision to abolish or retain
capital punishment finally rests. When abolition
has been considered, the legislatures have generally
voted to retain the death penalty. This might be
explained either on the basis that legislators lag
behind the opinion changes of their constituents,
or that the public, as accurately reflected in the
4 These states are Michigan, Rhode Island (which
permits capital punishment only for life term convicts
who commit murder), Wisconsin, Maine, Minnesota,
North Dakota (which retains the death penalty for
murder by a prisoner serving a life term for murder),
Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Iowa, West Virginia, Vermont,
and New York (which retains the death penalty for
murder of a police officer on duty, or of anyone by a
prisoner under life sentence). For a discussion of the
use of capital punishment in the United States and in
foreign countries, see Patrick, The Status of Capital
Punishnent: A World Perspective, 56 J. Csnr. L.C. &
P.S. 397 (1965).41 It has not been established whether this decrease
is primarily due to the reluctance of juries to bring in a
verdict which might result in an execution, the re-
luctance of judges (where they have discretion) to
impose the death penalty, or the fact that more such
sentences are reversed on appeal or commuted.
44 Based on figures reported by the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons in National Prisoner Statistics-.
45 For example, there were no executions in 1968, two
in 1967, and one in 1966.
legislatures, actually favors the death penalty.
In the short run, however, it does not matter which
of these reasons is correct; the fact remains that
the death penalty has not been abolished in many
jurisdictions.
Inconclusive evidence of public opinion is
available from those states where a referendum to
abolish the death penalty has been taken. A 1958
Oregon referendum was defeated by a close vote,
but in 1964 the referendum Was carried by a vote
of 455,654 to 302,105 and'the death penalty was
abolished. But in 1966 capital punishment was
retained in Colorado by a vote of 389,707 to
193,245.46
Most opinion polls are inconclusive, although
they do indicate-that opposition to capital punish-
ment is increasing. A Gallup. Poll conducted in
1953 showed 68% favored the death penalty for
persons convicted of murder, 25% opposed it, and
7% were undecided. 4 The same group conducted
similar surveys posing the same question in 1960
and 1965. In 1960, 51% favored the death penalty,
36% opposed it, and 13% were undecided.4 In
1965, 45% were in favor, 43% opposed, and 12%
undecided.,
These surveys are not as significant as they might
appear. Since the question asked only for a reac-
tion fo the use of death as a penalty for murder,
the results are suspect when used as an indication
of support for the use of the penalty for other
crimes. More people might have favored it if con-
fronted with a specific gruesome crime. On the
other hand, more people might have opposed it if
the question used had been framed in terms of an
opinion on capital punishment with regard to the
broad spectrum of crimes for which this penalty
can be imposed. A 1958 Roper Poll bears out this
uncertainty. Asked whether the heaviest penalty
given people convicted of the "worst" crimes
should be death or life imprisonment, 42% favored
the death penalty, 50% favored life imprisonment,
and 8% were undecided.5"
It is unlikely that most state legislators would
continue to oppose abolition if a substantial ma-
46 
BEDAU, DEATH PENALTY IN AmEniscA 233 (rev. ed.
1967).
47Id. at 237. The question asked was: "Are you. in
favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of
murder?"
48 Id. at 239.
49 BEDAU, supra note 46, at 238.
'0 BEDAU, supra note 1, at 234. This poll is of doubt-
ful significance because of use of the word "worst."
The individuals polled may have had widely divergent
views on which crimes are worst.
[Vol. 60
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jority-of people were, in fact, strongly:'opposed to
capital punishment. It is not illogical to conclude,
then, that the public has not been convinced by
existing studies and the abolitionists' criticismof
the deterrence andprotection-of society arguments.
It may be that the public feels a need for retribu-
tion which the death penalty satisfies and which
serves to justify it in spite of its lack of benefits in
other respects.
An important aspect of the capital punishment
controversy is centered about the relative, im-
portance which should be attributed to, the factors
of rehabilitation and retribution." If retribution
is its primary aim and the public feels thatonly
the death penalty can achieve it, the likelihood
that any specific criminal can be rehabilitated is
irrelevant. For those who consider rehabilitation
the primary aim of punishment and, feel it is
possible to rehabilitate even those-criminals who
committed capital crimes, the death penalty must
appear harmful. Some criminals can behelped and
others cannot. But the mere fact. that the only.
effective way to handle some criminals may be
life imprisonment without eligibility for parole does
not provide justification for their execution.
There is no proof that the level of support for the
death penalty in the legislatures is due to an over-
riding concern for retribution. To the contrary,
there is some indication that large segments of the
population have repudiated vengeance as a pri-
mary aim of punishment. Most religious groups
oppose capital punishment and have taken a
stand against measures motivated by desire for
revenge.2
But it is not necessary to conclude that rehabili-
tation and suitable retribution are mutually exclu-
sive. Confinement alone qualifies as punishment
and society's demand that criminals be punished
can certainly be met by imposition of prison terms.
51 Opinion on the issue of whether retribution is a
proper aim of punishment splits three ways. One posi-
tion is that it is never a proper aim and should be
avoided in all cases. A second position is that punish-
ment for the sole purpose of vengeance is undesirable,
but that this is one of numerous permissible aims of
punishment. The third position is that retribution is a
proper aim for all punishment and may become the
primary concern in appropriate cases, e.g., a person who
has committed a crime particularly shocking to the
public.
2See, e.g., Milligan, A Protestant's View of the Death
Penalty, reprinted in BEDAU, supra note 1, at 175, and
Kazis, Judais-m and the Death Penalty, reprinted in
BEDAU, supra note 1, at 171. Whether the official
position of such groups is a reflection of its members'
opinions or is at attempt to "lead" these opinions is
open to question.
An argument has been-made that societvdemands
the death penalty for certain criminals -and that if
they are not executed, private, action will result.
But experience m states which abolished capital
Dunishment has shown, no increase in lynchings or
similar action has resulted. The South, which has
the -greatest incidence of private action, is char-
acterized by a high execution level.P
-, ECWT LEGAL IssuEs,
Although the battle.over the death penalty has
been carried out primarily in- the legislatures,' the
controyersy has recently been brought tot1he
courts. witk-bgreater frequency. The argument: that
execution is cruel and unusual punishment pro-
hibited by the Eighth Amendment has been un-
s uccessful."Historically the Eighth, ,Amendment
has been.used to prohibit punishment which is
inherently, cruel55 or cruelly excessive.5 6 But
punishment by -death-at least where it does not
add unnecessary,pain-has consisteaftly been held.
outside- of the. Eighth Amendment, prohibition.
7
Courts have also rejected the contention .that
capital punishment is per sea denial of due process.
For example, the Washington Supreme Court
recently held that:,
* * * The Fifth Amendment reters specifically
to "capital cases", and also states... that a
-person may not be deprived -of his life without'
due process. The Fifth Amendment also pro-
vides that a person may not be twice put in
jeopardy of his life. Implicit in these are their
corollaries-that the state may deprive an-
individual of his life if the proceedings are in
accord with the requirements of due process
and- may place him in jeopardy once for a
given offense. Certainly, if the state can call
upon the most responsible and law abiding of
its young men to sacrifice their lives in battle,
it has the power, under the constitution, to
execute one who, in a proceeding in which the
requirements of due process have been strictly
observed, has been found by a jury of his peers
to have committed a crime so heinous that, in
5Comment, supra note 19, at 538-39.
"See Bell v. Patterson, 279 F.Supp. 760 (D.Colo.
1968).
5See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Carral, 99 F.Supp. 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (confinement in death row awaiting
execution is not inherently cruel).
11 See, e.g., State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788
(1952).
5 See, e.g., In re Storti, 178 Mass. 549 60 N.E. 210
(1901).
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its opinion, his life should be exacted as a
penalty.53
While the United States Supreme Court has not
recently considered whether capital punishment is
per se unconstitutional, recent decisions have
restricted the use of the death penalty by holding
unconstitutional some of the procedures by which
its imposition was determined.
In United States v. Jackson,59 a six-Justice ma-
jority held the death penalty provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act, 60 which limited the death
penalty to cases where the jury recommended it,
violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Since
the death penalty could be imposed only on de-
fendants who asserted their right to a jury trial,
the provision needlessly discouraged defendants
from pleading innocent and demanding a jury
trial. The majority did not rest its decision upon
the assumption that the only purpose of this
provision was to limit the assertion of basic con-
stitutional rights. The majority was concerned with
the effect rather than the purpose of the provision.
To them, it was irrelevant whether the chilling
effect of these rights was incidental or intentional;
the question was whether the chilling effect was
unnecessary and thus excessive.61
In spite of the fact that some states have pro-
visions similar to the one held unconstitutional in
Jackson, the effect of this decision has been limited.
The highest courts of some states have distin-
guished Jackson. In State v. Laws6' the New Jersey
Supreme Court reasoned that the Jackson holding
was not relevant where the power to reverse and
nullify a death sentence is vested in an appellate
court. Thus it held that a death sentence resulting
from the failure of the jury to recommend mercy
in a first degree murder conviction was not un-
constitutional since it had the power to reduce such
a sentence.6 In State v. Peele" the North Carolina
11 State v. Smith, 446 P.2d 571, 589 (Wash. 1968).
59 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
60 18 U.S.C. §1201 (a).
61 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-583
(1968).
62 51 N.J. 494 242 A.2d 333 (1968).
63 But it does not appear from Jackson that the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act would have been saved by the
power in an appellate court to reverse or reduce the
penalty. In Jackson, the Court was concerned with a
needless chilling effect on the exercise of the right to a
jury trial. This objection is not eliminated by such a
power in an appellate court. A death penalty is still
possible only when the right to a jury trial has been
asserted. Thus the objectionable needless chilling effect
is still present.
274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968).
Supreme Court held that a provision making the
death penalty mandatory upon a rape conviction
unless the jury specifically ruled otherwise was
constitutional. This court distinguished Jackson.
The Federal Kidnapping Act allowed an accused
kidnapper to escape the possibility of a death
sentence either by pleading guilty or by requesting
a bench trial. The North Carolina provision
allowed the avoidance of a possible death sentence
only by a guilty plea; if the plea was accepted by
the state with the approval of the court, it had the
effect of a guilty verdict with a life recommenda-
tion. The court characterized this provision as
benefitting the defendant. 6'
In Witherspoon v. Illinois66 the Supreme Court
held that putting the power to impose the death
penalty in the hands of a jury from which there
had been excluded all persons expressing general
objections to or religious scruples against capital
punishment was violative of the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Unless a venireman states un-
ambiguously that he would vote against the death
penalty regardless of what the trial might reveal,
he cannot be excluded. If veniremen are excluded
on any basis broader than this absolute refusal to
impose the death penalty under any circumstances,
the imposition of the death penalty is unconsti-
tutional and the sentence cannot be carried out.67
If it is true that persons with conscientious or
religious scruples against the death penalty will
seldom if ever vote to impose it (as Justice Black
suggests in his dissent to Witherspoon"), this
decision will undoubtedly decrease the number of
such sentences returned. Since the decision is
retroactive, it will require resentencing of some
defendants now awaiting execution. But Justice
65 Even if the North Carolina court was correct in
characterizing this provision as for the benefit of the
defendant, it is still objectionable under the Jackson
reasoning. Since under this provision the possibility of
a death sentence could be avoided only by a guilty plea,
it has an even stronger chilling effect on basic constitu-
tional rights than the Jackson situation. To avoid the
possibility of the death penalty, a defendant need not
only waive his right to jury trial but must also plead
guilty.
66 391 U.S. 510 (1968).6 This decision does not prevent the exclusion from
the jury of veniremen who make "unmistakably clear
... that they would automatcally vote against the
imposition of capital punishment without regard to
any evidence that might be developed at the trial of
the case before them, or ... that their attitude toward
the death penalty would prevent them from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guil." 391
U.S. at 522-523 n.21. But a high standard for permis-
sible exclusion of veniremen has obviously been set.
63391 U.S. at 532.
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White, dissenting in Witherspoon,69 has suggested
that the future effect of this decision could easily
be avoided by the legislature in any state where the
jury now has the power to impose the death penalty
by requiring only majority agreement rather than
unanimity by the jury on the question of the
sentence.
The majority in Witherspoon did not go as far
as the Fourth Circuit did in Crawford v. Bounds.
70
That court held the exclusion of prospective jurors
on the basis of their capital punishment views
voided both the sentence and the conviction. The
majority in Crawford was unable to agree on a
rationale for this decision. Two judges felt that
the systematic exclusion of any identifiable group
within the community from which the jury venire
is drawn violates the equal protection clause,
irrespective of a showing of prejudice.
73 Two other
judges felt it was wrong to rely so heavily on the
equal protection ground. They reasoned that due
process was violated simply because the issue of
guilt was submitted to a jury from which every
juror with scruples against the death penalty was
excluded without inquiring whether these beliefs
would preclude a fair consideration of the guilt
issue. Three judges apparently based their de-
cision flatly on the essential unfairness of excluding
every juror professing an "unexplained scruple"
against capital punishment while seating every
juror who professed a belief in it.
Jackson and Witherspoon are significant not
only because of their effect on the imposition
of the death penalty, but also because they show
the United States Supreme Court is now willing
to take a constitutional stand in the capital punish-
ment controversy. Perhaps as a result of these
decisions, death penalty provisions have since
come under increased attack in the state courts;
the bases for these attacks have not been limited
to the arguments which were successful in Jackson
and Witherspoon. While these attacks have gen-
erally not been successful, they may signal a new
era: The capital punishment controversy is in-
creasingly being carried on in the courts.
Some state death sentence provisions have
9 391 U.S. at 540.
70 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).
71 Apparently this is also the position taken by justice
Douglas in his separate opinion in Witherspoon. 391
U.S. 510, 523 (1968). He would not require a showing
of prejudice with respect to guilt since he is willing to
assume than in many, if not most, cases of class exclu-
sion some prejudice does result.
.recently been attacked as lacking standards for
imposition of the death penalty, thus resulting in
a denial of due process and equal protection. This
contention was raised before and rejected by at
least two state supreme courts. The Washington
Supreme Court reasoned that it was permissible
for a jury to decide whether a particular punish-
-ment should be imposed as long as it did not, in
,so doing, determine the nature of the offense.72
But a minority of the California Supreme Court
argued that statutes without standards for imposi-
tion of the death penalty violate due process
because, without standards, no meaningful review
is possible. It also considered such statutes to be
a denial of equal protection since they allow a jury
to practice invidious discrimination-persons who
commit the same crime and who cannot be classi-
fied differently on any reasonable basis can be
given fundamentally different sentences.7 8
With these increasing statements by the courts,
it is probable that the United States Supreme
Court will eventually have to face the question of
the per se constitutionality of the death penalty.
The contention that capital punishment is un-
constitutional, under the Eighth Amendment is
frequently raised.
It has long been recognized that the Eighth
Amendment was not designed to eliminate merely
physical brutalities.74 The Supreme Court of the
United States has, by reference to "standards of
decency more or less universally accepted" 75 and
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the
process of a maturing society," 76 recognized that
the definition of inherently cruel and cruelly exces-
sive punishment is not static. Since the Court
apparently believes that the purview of this
Amendment changes with the societal standard for
acceptable punishment, the courts may be expected
72 State v. Smith, 446 P.2d 571 (Wash. 1968).
73 In re Anderson, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117
(1968).
The majority set aside the defendant's death sen-
tence on the basis of Witherspoon, but held that the
death penalty statutes themselves were not unconstitu-
tional. It felt that absolute discretion as to sentence
could be left to the trier of fact and, since the statute
did this, the appellate courts could not substitute their
judgment on penalty for that of the trier of fact. The
majority felt there was adequate protection against
arbitrary abuses since the trial judge could review and
reduce a sentence on a motion for a new trial and the
governor could grant a pardon or commutation.
7 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
75Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
469 (1947).76 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
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to look to data relevant to that standardY. The
standard used will probably be based, either di-
rectly or tacitly, on public opinion. At least some
justices of the Supreme Court have shown an
acute awareness of public opinion on the capital
punishment issue.
But a court may invalidate a particular punish-
ment only when there is an obvious societal stand-
ard which has been violated.79 Existing public
opinion surveys80 do not provide an adequate
indication of a societal standard with regard to
use of the death penalty. Thus, unless polls which
convincingly show the existence of a societal
standard rejecting capital punishment can be
offered, such legal attacks must fail and the resolu-
tion of the controversy must, by necessity, be left
to the legislatures. The legislatures are presumably
more responsive to public opinion than the courts.
Consequently, if the controversy is to be decided
on the basis of what the public thinks is appro-
priate, the courts should defer to the legislative
judgment unless public opinion is obvious.
Some members of the Supreme Court of the
United States have indicated a willingness to use,
as evidence of a societal standard, the results of
polls. In Rudolph v. Alabamag the Court refused to
grant certiorari to consider whether the imposition
of the death penalty for rape was prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment. Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented from
the refusal. One of the questions the minority would
have considered was whether the punishment by
death for rape was violative of societal standards,
and in doing so, would have considered the results
of a survey of sixty-five countries.
82
At this time, the Goldberg dissent in Rudolph
has not been used as precedent for a decision on the
merits. For example, while the court in Bell v.
Patterson83 noted that the scope of the Eighth
Amendment was not static, it concluded that it
was not broad enough to proscribe the death
penalty as cruel and unusual punishment. Interest-
ingly, the basis for this'court's holding is somewhat
7 See Note, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual
-Capital Punishment, 42 N.C. L. REv. 909 (1964):
78 See notes 81-82 infra and accompanying text.
79 See Note, supra note 77.80 See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
81375 U.S. 889 (1963).
8 The Goldberg dissent in Rudolph was critically
analyzed in Parker, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071 (1964).
83 279 F.Supp. 760 (D.Colo. 1968).
contradictory to the idea that the scope of this
amendment changes with societal standards-an
idea which this court purports to accept. The
court remarked that "[T]he decisions upholding
the validity of the death penalty have not been
overruled or even determined. Hence the law of
the land as of the present moment is that the
death penalty does not ,violate the Constitution
of the United States." 8 It would seem that if the
scope of the Eighth Amendment is not considered
static, earlier decisions on its scope are significant
only to the extent that societal standards have not
changed.
CONCLUSION
The 150 year old controversy over the death
penalty is in need of settlement. But it is unlikely
that such settlement will be reached through
another "logical" analysis of the arguments which
are as old as the controversy. Nor will settlement
be likely to come through the development of
new arguments.
Whether the controversy is ultimately settled
in the legislatures or in the courts, the resolution
will depend upon public opinion. Thus the ap-
proach to the controversy of rephrasing the old
arguments, changing the emphasis to those cur-
rently in vogue, and adding emotional appeals in
current fashion must be abandoned, and more
emphasis placed on determining what the public
actually thinks about capital punishment.
But this does not mean that other issues such as
the existence of a deterrent effect, existence of
discrimination in application, and the necessity
of protecting society can be ignored. Both reten-
tionists and abolitionists can contribute to the
resolution of the controversy by presenting em-
pirical evidence to sustain their position on each
of these issues. It is by presenting such evidence
that public opinion can be changed.
Recent experience may indicate that the death
penalty is fast becoming a thing of the past. In
spite of the fact that attempts to abolish capital
punishment in the legislatures have generally
failed, that attempts to have it declared uncon-
stitutional are unsuccessful, and that many death
sentences are still being returned, very few crimi-
nals have been executed in recent years. But it is
unlikely that the controversy over capital punish-
ment will so easily disappear.
84 279 F.Supp. at 765.
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